Tag Archive for: Brexit

On Saturday 17 October 2020, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson wrote an open letter to the nation:

“Since the outset of our negotiations we were totally clear that we wanted nothing more complicated than the relationship the EU has with Canada.

One based on friendship and free trade.

But for much of the last few months the EU have refused to negotiate seriously.

Demanding the continued ability to control our legislative freedom and our fisheries in a way that is completely unacceptable to an independent country.

Which is why yesterday [16 October 2020] I decided that we should get ready for the end of the transition period on January 1st with arrangements based on the simple principles of global free trade, like Australia’s relationship.

For whatever reason the EU are not willing to offer this country, after 45 years of membership, the same terms as they did to Canada.

So now is the time to prepare.

And with you by our side we can do that with high hearts and complete confidence.

By embracing this alternative path we will prosper mightily as an independent free trading nation, controlling our own borders, our own fisheries and setting our own laws.

Boris Johnson

Prime Minister

The UK-wide referendum vote in June 2016 returned a wafer-thin majority in favour of Brexit.  Devolved regions, including Scotland – and British Overseas Territories, including Gibraltar – voted, some of them overwhelmingly, in to ‘remain’.

Over the last three-and-a-half years, the UK has struggled to come to terms with the outcome of the vote.  Initial discussion focussed on how profound the split should be.  A minimal split – with the UK in a similar position to other EU neighbours, such as Norway, allied within an economic but non-political ‘European Economic Area’.  This was favoured by business, commerce, central and left leaning political parties.  Or, whether to make a total break – leaving the UK outside: the ‘Single Market’; the ‘Customs Union’; and other forms of shared activities – such as anti-criminal, scientific, environmental and educational cooperation – the stance favoured by the ‘hard-line’ Brexit proponents.  In the end, the UK has chosen to sever all ties and leave on ‘third-country’ status.  This is entirely the UK’s own decision.  Whenever the subject has been raised, every EU representative has consistently expressed regret – firstly about the UK decision to leave at all, and then for the conditions under which the UK has chosen to leave.

Throughout the three-and-a half year Brexit process, the EU has shown patience with the UK – given that the decision to quit the bloc is one that can only weaken the strength of Europe and one that will harm its future – directly through the need to apply ‘third-country’ conditions to all dealing with the UK from 1 January 2021, and indirectly from the lack of the leading contribution from the UK to all aspects of social, economic, financial and scientific life in Europe.

UK management of the leaving process and timetable

Following the Brexit vote, the UK began to consider the terms on which it wished to end its membership of the EU.  Nine months after the referendum, Article 50 of the Consolidated EU Treaty was invoked by the UK on 29 March 2017 – triggering the minimum 2-year ‘notice period’ required by the treaty.

During the notice period, the UK remained a full and active member of the EU with all the rights and responsibilities – along with the freedoms and constraints – that it had been party to developing during its 47-year membership.  It continued to be represented and participate within each of the three ‘EU pillars’: the European Council, European Parliament the European Commission.

Towards the end of the minimum notice period, instead of a leaving on 29 March 2019, an extension of two weeks was requested by the UK Government in order to give the House of Commons time to reconsider its rejection of the negotiated withdrawal conditions.  The revised leaving date, 12 April 2019 – was again postponed.  This required the EU to accept the UK’s request for a ‘flexible’ extension with an end-date of 31 October 2019.

Between April and October 2019, a 500 page ‘Withdrawal Agreement’ was negotiated between the UK and EU.  In the end, this Agreement was subsequently ratified by the UK and European authorities during January 2020 and passed into UK Law and then formalised in an International ‘Treaty’.

The UK ended its membership of the EU at 23:00 GMT on 31 January 2020 after 47 years.

From 1 February 2020, the UK – whilst no longer a member of the EU – has been allowed to operate as if had remained an integral part of the European Union’s ‘Single Market’ or ‘Customs Union’.  The ‘transition period’ established in the Withdrawal Agreement allowed the UK time to negotiate future trading terms and to prepare for leaving the Single Market and Customs Union.

The length of the Transition Period was always the UK’s to set.  Any time until at least until the end of 2022 was an option – simply by naming the date.  The Conservative Government in its election manifesto, however, had stated that it would deliver the end of transition in the shortest possible practical time – claiming that it had an ‘oven-ready’ deal requiring minimal negotiations and a straightforward implementation – and did not need longer.

An end to the transition period was set as 23:00 GMT on 31 December 2020 by the UK Government – and immediately enshrined in UK law, leveraging the Government’s 80 seat majority in the House of Commons.  And so, the transition end-date became a constitutionally unchangeable event.

UK negotiations on terms of trade and the relationship with the EU post-transition

Between June 2016 and October 2020, a series of UK Ministers responsible for Foreign and EU affairs have held responsibility for overseeing the UK’s departure from the EU: setting the strategic direction; defining the ‘red lines’ without which there could be no deal; steering the decisions through Parliament in Westminster; negotiating the ‘Withdrawal Agreement’ with counter-parties from the EU; attempting to negotiate a ‘deal’ with Europe for the end of transition; replacing EU law and regulations with domestic equivalents – eight major Acts of Parliament and 600 ‘statutory instruments’ – and; preparing civil service, UK businesses and citizens for the end of the ‘4 freedoms’ –  free movement of goods, services capital and people.

The optimism maintained by successive Ministers since 2016 is little short of heroic.  The success that the same Ministers have achieved in securing and preparing for a ‘smooth’ transition is a long way short of heroic…and include: David Davies, Dominic Raab, Stephen Barclay, David Jones, the Baroness Anelay of St Johns, the Lord Callanan, the Lord Bridges of Headley, Steve Baker, Suella Braverman, Chris Heaton-Harris, Kwasi Kwarteng, James Cleverley, Robin Walker, and James Duddridge.

The European Commission has been directed and led by European Commission Chief Negotiator, Michel Barnier, throughout.

The EU set out its brief to its negotiating team in February 2020 – and the UK a month later.

The UK’s ambition was for a trade deal on the most favourable terms in place with any third nation – with some additional agreements on recognition of each other’s regulatory standards.  David Davies spoke of it as “Canada + +”.  The EU never acknowledged that this could or would be politically or operationally feasible.

Ending transition without a deal for trade in goods in place means hard borders, trading under WTO terms with tariffs and quotas, and no automatic recognition and acceptance of UK qualifications, certification, or standards.  Further, without a deal for trade in goods as a foundation, it is all but impossible to imagine agreement on services, finance, education, scientific and anti-crime cooperation.

During the early years of negotiations, the EU published a guidelines for smoothing some of transition issues – especially those needing time to make adjustments – for instance in aerospace, the airline and haulage industries.  With the UK initial vacillation on what it wanted, compounded by the series of arbitrary delays, and the final insistence by the UK on its red lines for the fishing industry and non-acceptance of the EU rules on non-intervention and government subsidies in competitive industry.

The concessions – unilaterally offered by the EU to make UK’s leaving easier – were not indefinite.  Timed to run from the UK’s notice of leaving in 2019, they had fixed end dates – depending on the complexity of achieving a smooth transition – after 3-6 months.

It is significant that EU attitudes and patience with the UK have hardened.  By the end of transition on 31 December 2020 all the concessions have ‘expired’ – and have not been renewed by the EU.  The ‘cliff edge’ so feared by Theresa May is looming.  It is almost incredulous that the UK Government is deaf to the concerns raised by 70 business groups united with the voices of trades unions and academic experts alike.

How will history judge the hard-line Brexiteers?  Perhaps, ‘be careful what you wish for’.

A fundamental principle of free trade is that Governments must not subsidise companies or business sectors that would give any advantage when trading in a partner state.

The UK – as a member of the EU – was party to:

• the EU bloc-wide regime on restricting trade-distorting ‘state aid’; and
• the EU umbrella agreement with the WTO on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.

The UK has never had its own domestic legislation addressing state aid – and operates under the EU-wide state aid rules.

EU and WTO state aid rules apply to the UK till the end of the transition period on 31 December 2020.  Thereafter, the UK government has announced that its commitments under the WTO will be the foundation for a future UK independent subsidy ‘regime’.

Although the Government intends to set independent UK subsidy regime, both EU state aid rules and the WTO Agreement on subsidies and countervailing measures will remain relevant in the UK.  The extent of this effect will depend upon the result of the UK-EU future relationship negotiations.

This briefing looks at: what EU state aid rules mean; some recent changes brought about in response to the coronavirus outbreak; state aid rules during the transition period – and the settlement of ‘ongoing’ disputes; and the main principles of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing measures.

EU and ‘State Aid’

EU Member States sometimes use public resources to intervene in their national economies by assisting companies or industries.  This can range from a government tax relief scheme for investors, to a local authority giving a subsidy to a property developer.  Such ‘state aid’ is normally prohibited if it threatens to distort trade and competition between firms, through for example, discouraging investment and increasing costs to consumers.  EU state aid rules aim to create a level playing field so that, for example, French firms can compete fairly with German ones.

The EU and its Member States also use state aid as a policy tool.  Exemptions to the EU state aid rules allow for certain beneficial interventions. For example, state aid might be necessary and justified to address a market failure, as when small and medium enterprises (SMEs) have difficulties finding investment capital.   It may also be necessary to achieve policy goals such as regional economic development or environmental protection.  Governments can, for instance, use state aid to stimulate businesses to invest in less developed areas or the development of advanced environmentally friendly technologies.

The European Commission is empowered to assess cases of state aid.  It can ‘approve’ them, or it can enforce stringent ‘claw-back’ mechanisms when state aid is deemed unlawful.

An EU Member State cannot pay out state aid unless a scheme or an aid measure is approved by the European Commission.  Policymakers must ensure that support is legal and compliant with EU guidelines.  However, there are many exemptions, including the ‘de minimis’ rule (assistance worth less than €200,000 over three years) and the General Block Exemption Regulation.  These exemptions generally allow smaller schemes to be set up without a prior notification in Brussels.  In addition, EU state aid rules do not restrict support are open to all businesses – such as a general reduction in rates of corporation tax, or changes in employment law.

The European Commission is presently re-evaluating state aid rules.  This is expected to result in amended rules in several areas, including energy and environmental aid.  There will also be more flexibility towards transnational projects supporting strategically important technologies and value chains.

The EU has temporarily relaxed the usual state aid restrictions to give Member States more flexibility to support their economies in response to the coronavirus outbreak.

During its time as an EU Member State, successive UK governments have supported rigorous state aid controls – and have avoided subsidising particular industries or companies.

The UK public sector has spent less in business support than most other EU countries.  In 2018, the UK spent 0.38% of GDP on state aid (excluding railways, and agriculture and fisheries), while France spent 0.79% and Germany 1.45%.

During the transition period, the UK continues to apply EU state aid rules and regulations and the EC continues to assess and approve UK state aid measures.  The Commission will be able to finish ongoing procedures and take follow-up action for up to four years beyond the end of the transition.  After that date, the Commission will also have power to initiate new examinations of UK aid, which authorities may have paid to businesses prior to the end of transition.

The Protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland foresees that EU state aid law will apply in Northern Ireland with regard to trade in goods and electricity between Northern Ireland and the EU.  The European Commission remains the enforcement authority.

World Trade Organisation – Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures

In addition to EU state aid rules, the UK is party to the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and the UK government has announced that its commitments under the WTO will play an important role in the future UK subsidy regime.

Under the Agreement, some subsidies are prohibited outright while the remainder are ‘actionable’ – meaning that the subsidy is allowed but other countries can take certain actions if the subsidy ‘harms’ them.  Other countries can protect their industries by taxing imports of subsidised goods – known as imposing a ‘countervailing duty’.

The definition of a ‘subsidy’ under the WTO regime is broadly similar to ‘state aid’ in EU law.  The EU rules are, however, a lot more stringent than the WTO rules on subsidies.  The key differences are:

• The default position under WTO rules is that subsidies are generally allowed, while EU rules consider subsidies to be generally unlawful;
• WTO rules apply only to goods.  EU rules also apply to services;
• EU rules are applied ‘prospectively’ – legality must be proven before the awarding any support.  WTO rules are ‘reactive’ and only triggered if a member country lodges a complaint;
• WTO rules rely on state-to-state enforcement.  EU rules provide for remedies to businesses and individuals;
• Under EU rules, each recipient business has to repay illegal state aid.  There is no such mechanism to redress anti-competitive effects under the WTO rules.

In 2018, the UK committed to uphold and trade within WTO rules in its own right as an independent state.  If the UK and the EU do not reach a free trade agreement by 31 December, WTO rules will apply equally to all trade in goods – be it with an EU member or any of the other 160+ WTO member states across the rest of the World.

References

http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN06775/SN06775.pdf

The UK-EU future relationship negotiations – ‘Level playing field’ https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8852/

https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/united_kingdom_e.htm#:~:text=The%20United%20Kingdom%20has%20been%20a%20WTO%20member,Communities%20for%20legal%20reasons%29%20in%20its%20own%20right.

The House of Lords has the task of forensically examining all aspects of the Government’s plans and preparations for the end of the Brexit transition period – 23:00 GMT on 31 December 2020 – now just 15 weeks away. They will re-visit the subject on Monday 21 September 2020.

Their work to date has assumed – as set out in the formal response in July to their previous report from Chris Grayling, then Secretary of State for Transport – that there will be a “smooth and orderly withdrawal” from the EU, including agreement on road, rail and maritime matters.

Their scope was “surface transport issues – primarily in the context of a negotiated Brexit” – but they also examined ‘no-deal’ preparations on both sides of the Channel.

They reported that some of the contingency options to maintain connectivity in a no-deal scenario – or in a negotiated Brexit that did not include comprehensive transport arrangements – were already established and “could be relied upon over the long term” (for example those in relation to some international bus travel).  Other contingencies took the form of “temporary legislative measures designed to avoid a ‘cliff edge’”.  Examples of the latter included measures allowing temporary market access for hauliers.

The report highlighted routes by which both types of arrangements could be improved, whether in the context of a negotiated or no-deal end to Brexit transition.

Report in summary

The report included 43 detailed conclusions and recommendations spanning a variety of issues relating to surface transport.  These included issues not only affecting the road, rail and maritime sectors, but also those relating to the specific situation on the island of Ireland and certain “cross-modal” matters such as communication with businesses, passenger rights and infrastructure investment.

In respect of rail and maritime matters, the committee noted the then Government’s stated intention to pursue bilateral agreements on UK-EU rail links, namely the connection between Kent and northern France and the Belfast-Dublin Enterprise Line.  It also noted that maritime transport is largely underpinned by international law, meaning that after Brexit UK and EU maritime operators would, in most respects, be able to access each other’s ports as had been the case during the UK’s membership of the bloc.

However, on road transport the committee said that it was “difficult to overstate the importance of future arrangements to preserve UK-EU market access for hauliers” and called on the Government to work closely with the road haulage industry to make clear its priorities for future arrangements.  It also urged an agreement on reciprocal market access for bus and coach travel; the principle of seeking agreement on mutual recognition in vehicle standards; and continuity in the present arrangements for private motorists.

On the specific circumstances on the island of Ireland, the committee called on the Government to seek agreement on maintaining the existing rights of bus and coach operators and hauliers.  On other matters, the committee urged the Government to continue its “high level of engagement” with stakeholder groups.

Background

The renegotiated Withdrawal Agreement and associated Political Declaration of October 2019 included reference to modes of surface transport in line with its predecessor document.  It stated the following in respect of future road, rail and maritime arrangements:

Road: “The parties should ensure comparable market access for freight and passenger road transport operators”, subject to certain underpinnings and obligations, and “should consider complementary arrangements to address travel by private motorists”.

Rail: “The parties agree that bilateral arrangements should be established, as appropriate, for cross-border rail services, including to facilitate the continued smooth functioning and operation of rail services, such as the Belfast-Dublin Enterprise Line and services through the Channel Tunnel”.

Maritime: “The parties note that passenger and cargo connectivity in the maritime transport sector will be underpinned by the international legal framework” and “should also make appropriate arrangements on market access for international maritime transport services”. In addition, the future relationship “should facilitate cooperation on maritime safety and security […] consistent with the United Kingdom’s status as a third country”.

However, neither the UK nor the EU brief to their respective negotiating teams featured maritime or rail issues prominently.  Road transport, on the other hand, received more attention.

The UK position was essentially that UK and EU road haulage and passenger transport operators “should be entitled to provide services to, from and through each other’s territories with no quantitative restrictions”.

By contrast, the EU position was that while it envisaged open market access for bilateral road freight transport, UK road haulage operators “should not be granted the same level of rights and benefits” as those enjoyed by EU hauliers when travelling within the territory of a member state or from one member state to another.  It called for level playing field rules to apply to operators and drivers, and non-regression on current standards.

Status of UK-EU negotiations with 100 days until the end of transition arrangements

Transport has been the subject of talks during several rounds of the negotiations to date.  However, it has been reported that road haulage remains a “point of friction”.

On 2 September 2020 the EU’s chief negotiator, Michel Barnier, elaborated on the EU’s reservations about the UK’s requests in this area during a speech at the Institute of International and European Affairs in Dublin.  He noted that while the UK wanted a “clean break” from the EU, this did not appear to extend to areas such as transport in which British negotiators were “still seeking continuity”.  Arguing that UK demands on road haulage were too close to single market rights, Mr Barnier said:

“The UK Government is still looking to keep the benefits of the EU and of the single market, without the obligations.  The UK often says it would be in the EU’s interest to grant it a special status in these strategic areas of cooperation [transport, energy, goods conformity assessments and on aspects of police and judicial cooperation].  But, frankly speaking: is it really in the EU’s long-term economic interest?  For instance, …British proposals on road transport would allow British truckers to drive on EU roads without having to comply with the same working conditions as EU drivers.”

In a post-negotiation statement on the eighth round of talks issued on 10 September 2020, Barnier said that the UK; “had not engaged on … level playing field requirements” in connection with transport matters.

The UK’s chief negotiator, Lord David Frost, set out the Government’s position on the state of the negotiations generally. He is reported as having said the Government was “not going to accept provisions that lock [the UK] into the way the EU do things”.

There is a perfect storm brewing combining the effects of:

• a no-deal end to Brexit transition;
• a new set of requirements for goods movements reporting – along with a supporting software system that it appears will not be ready, let alone tested, by 31December;
• potential interruptions due to response to terrorist threats – such as occurred on 16 September causing “operation stack” to be deployed; and
• increasing reluctance of drivers to travel for extended periods abroad due to Covid-19 concerns.

Transport, logistics and supply chains will be severely stretched and tested in the Christmas and New Year period between Great Britain and Europe.  Delays and disruption to continuity are now all but inevitable – it is a question of degree with ‘deal or no-deal’ a key factor.  The situation between Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and between Northern Ireland and Ireland is even more fraught.

References

https://old.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-internal-market-subcommittee/future-uk-eu-transport-arrangements/190720-ChrisGrayling-BaronessDonaghy-Gov-Response-to-Transport-Report.pdf

https://www.brexit-partners.com/blog/2020/8/19/uk-government-unveils-strict-new-cross-border-plans-from-1-january-2021-deal-or-no-deal

https://www.brexit-partners.com/blog/2020/5/11/parliamentary-scrutiny-highlights-continuing-brexit-uncertainty-for-business-and-citizens-in-britain-and-northern-ireland

Photo:  PA/BBC

The UK has a Brexit negotiating team of 50 civil servants in Brussels today.  They are led by Britain’s chief negotiator, David Frost – who met European Commission chief negotiator, Michel Barnier for an informal dinner last night.  This is for Round 7 of the UK-EU Brexit talks on setting the terms for future trade and cooperation to come into effect on 1 January 2021.

Even if the two sides can reach a free trade agreement in sufficient time to get all EU central institutions and each of the 27 states to sign-up – businesses should take note that the UK plans to adopt the strict border controls in any event.

With 4 months to go, the Government has just announced a month-long consultation on a blueprint for a traffic management system designed to limit tailbacks for vehicles heading to Dover and Eurotunnel.

Department of Transport said in a statement: “Something akin to Operation Brock will need to be confirmed for use at the end of the transition period.”   The DoT anticipates disruption at the cross-Channel ports as “clearly a possibility.”

The new rules are complex and detailed.  They introduce ‘pre-registration’ of the journey and details of goods carried.  In a no-deal scenario the complexity of declarations will be compounded by tariff and quota declarations.  The chances of getting something wrong are manifest – especially in the early months of 2021.

There is an increasing risk that, whether based in the EU or the UK, haulage companies at corporate level – and drivers as individuals – will simply consider the risks and costs outweigh the rewards, compared to shipping and driving across the Channel today.

Trucks without the right documents risk “being held at port until the relevant paperwork has been provided, and in some circumstances having their goods seized or destroyed,” the government said in the consultation.

Truck drivers who don’t comply with the system could personally face a Fixed Penalty Notice of £300 under the government’s plan.

UK trucker furthermore face prosecution and the fine rising £1,000 unless paid within 28 days.

Non-UK drivers will be fined using “a financial penalty deposit notice and would have had to make an on-the-spot payment.  If drivers chose not to pay, they would have been at risk of having their HCV impounded.” [HCV = Heavy Commercial Vehicle, previously known as an HGV]

Under a new ‘Smart Freight System’, hauliers will have to fill in details on a government website showing they have the correct documents to enter the EU.  Then they will be issued with a permit giving permission to proceed to the port – and a window sticker for the police and port authorities to view in whilst in transit and customs clearance.

Rod McKenzie, Managing Director of policy and public affairs at the Road Haulage Association: “There is an overload of new systems coming to operate the border…It is essential that all systems work together to minimize bureaucracy and duplication, and that is not happening at the moment.”

The Government’s own analysis from October 2019 – when Operation Brock was trialled in anticipation of the UK leaving the EU without a deal – showed that hauliers were poorly prepared for the new customs checks.  As their attention is presently on dealing with the consequences for supply chains and logistics due to coronavirus, it would be prudent to assume that’s still the case.

We publish an extract from the Government website as an illustration of one element of the regulations coming in on 1 January 2021 – simply to show the complexity and underline how difficult it will be for hauliers and drivers to avoid finding themselves out of compliance – and in deep trouble.

In addition to the new ‘Smart Freight System’ for outgoing goods, a new ‘Goods Vehicle Movement Service’ (GVMS) means imports from the EU to the UK will also face full customs checks.   We cannot emphasise enough that with only 4 months to go, both the SFS and GVMS are still being developed and untested in live operations.  A failure in: the systems software; or the operation of the systems by hauliers and regulatory authorities means that goods movements come to a standstill.

Extract from UK Government’s “Proposed legislative amendments on enforcing Operation Brock” published on 4 August 2020

“Being border-ready

While it is the responsibility of the trader (or the trader’s agent, such as a customs agent or freight forwarder) to provide the necessary documentation to the HCV driver, it is the HCV driver who must present the documentation at the EU ports.

Being border-ready means that an HCV driver is carrying all the necessary documentation to get through the GB and EU port (or has been provided with the appropriate information to get the documentation).

This includes:

• customs documentation:
  • a master or movement reference number (MRN) from an import declaration if the goods are going to stay in the country of disembarkation (for example, goods going from GB to France), or a transit accompanying document if the goods are either staying in the country of disembarkation or going to move beyond it (for example, goods going from GB to Spain via France)
  • an admission temporaire/temporary admission (ATA) carnet if the goods are temporarily going abroad (for example, goods going from GB to France and then back to GB)
  • a transports internationaux routiers (TIR) carnet if goods are sealed and/or going to non-Common Transit Convention (CTC) member countries (for example, GB to India overland).
• import and export documentation depending on what goods are carried (it is possible that a free trade agreement or sectoral deal may change some of the requirements for import and export documentation). For example, EU member state authorities will check for the following on arrival at the EU port:
  • products of animal origin require an export health certificate
  • plant and plant-based products require a phytosanitary certificate
  • fish require a catch certificate, export health certificate and where appropriate a captain’s certificate.

Some documentation could be electronic or physical (like the MRN barcode) while others would need to be physical (like the ATA carnet). Please note that the list is not exhaustive; for more information, please refer to the Border Operating Model published on 13 July 2020.

In addition, there may be other forms of import/export documentation that an HCV driver will need to carry on behalf of their trader which would not be checked at the ports. An HCV driver using the accompanied roll on roll off (RoRo) route would need a safety and security declaration before arriving in the EU. However, EU rules mean that they can be completed shortly before arriving in the EU.

Some EU member states have additional national requirements for goods arriving from GB, for example:

• France requires the use of the SI Brexit system, and the MRN barcodes for multiple consignments must be compiled in to a single ‘envelope’ MRN that will be scanned
• the Netherlands and Belgium require that all movements are pre-notified using the Portbase and RXSeaport systems respectively; HCVs that are not pre-notified will not be allowed to leave Dutch or Belgian ports”

Commentary

After 40 years membership of the European Union including decades of free and unfettered trade and logistics, the UK is shifting to a ‘3^rd country’ set of border controls at 23:00 GMT on 31 December 2020.

We have already reported on the lack of progress in the recruitment and training of up to 6,000 customs and border officers needed to police the new regulations.

We have already reported on the lack of testing and communications with hauliers on operating and complying with the new regulations.

We note that new issues are only now coming to light – such as the need to meet EU regulations on the construction and certification of palettes arriving in Europe from 3^rd countries, such as the UK.  A regulation that is simply not relevant today – and which needs to be added to the changes that hauliers need to understand and adapt to.  There is presently no need and therefore no expertise or infrastructure in the manufacture and certification of EU compliant palettes in the UK – and less than 4 months to understand, adapt and implement.

Reference: https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/enforcing-operation-brock-plans-in-2021/proposed-legislative-amendments-on-enforcing-operation-brock